Despite all that power and time, you are reading this in English, not Chinese. You might be from one of the more than a dozen countries bordering China, with your own long history and language intact. Or perhaps you’re in Europe, sipping a cup of tea amid imperial ruins. Wherever you are, you repeatedly hear about the dangers of a rising China, yet perhaps the only “Chinese” threat you face is spending too much time at the all-you-can-eat buffet down the street. Indeed, General Tso is a troublesome figure; he’ll definitely leave you unsettled, but don’t worry, he’s chicken and isn’t really Chinese.

You might argue that old history provides no guarantees for the future, or that history is much more complicated than I’ve suggested. You can say that China limited itself in the past, avoiding the sort of imperial excesses associated with the rise?of other major global powers. However, there’s no certainty that China won’t exploit its newfound power today. And yet, isn’t it the case that China has developed as a modern nation without resorting to conquest, genocide, slavery, colonialism, and dispossession, contrary to the historical development of the G7 members?

In fact, there’s no future in such aggression, no security, nor mutually beneficial development, so why take that path now? It’s not as though China’s development was or is now contingent on exploiting other nations, unlike various Western powers that remain committed to systemic neo-colonial controls, which have kept large swaths of the Global South in a post-colonial morass.

You might argue that even if China avoided outright imperialism in the past, it did practice a complicated tributary state system and sometimes did engage in excesses, e.g., for a short period in what is today the northern part of Vietnam, around a thousand years ago. You might even argue that China overreached at one point centuries ago on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, without dismissing these histories, the examples are rather different from the U.S. asserting, for example, “Manifest Destiny” in the Western Hemisphere, or the right to invade, conquer, and occupy Iraq after 9/11. They have nothing in common with Napoleon trying to rule all of Europe, Alexander in India, or the Mongols conquering a very large part of Eurasia. In fact, in China’s case, one might say these rather small and brief exceptions actually prove the rule—that China has generally avoided aggression against other countries, past and present.

You might argue that China’s assertions of sovereignty over Xizang or Xinjiang are consistent with hegemony, yet, these areas have been Chinese territory since ancient times with well-documented historical facts. Or perhaps you’ll reference the frequently cited examples by anti-China hawks: Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the Diaoyu Islands, or its boundary dispute with India. However, these assertions are rooted in history, and like any other country, China must assert its indisputable sovereignty and legal rights, especially as aggressive foreign powers try to exploit these areas like a soft underbelly.

You might contend that, regardless of China’s intentions, the U.S. will provoke conflict. Step-by-step, as it did against Russia, the U.S. could expand AUKUS as it did with NATO, leveraging its control over the global financial system and its debt-financed military strength to destabilize the Asia-Pacific, while simultaneously waging economic warfare and encouraging tech decoupling to make China a less attractive place for business, trade, and development. In this context, you might also normalize problematic historical narratives such as the “Thucydides trap” or the “clash of civilizations.” But if that’s the case, then you’re either a victim of ignorance or willfully made yourself complicit with warmongering and the perpetuation of lies.

In fact, fearing China is nothing new. It was a popular theme in the late 1800s, when Western countries enacted laws to exclude Chinese immigrants and developed fear-inducing, racist narratives. These included the “yellow peril” myth that later intersected with the “Red Scare” during the 1950s and throughout the Cold War. Perhaps the only time the West didn’t fear China was when the U.S. convinced itself that China’s economic development would eventually cause the political system in Beijing to collapse, making China malleable to Washington’s whims. That didn’t happen, so exit the “collapse thesis,” and welcome back the “threat thesis.”

But even before the modern period, Western visitors to the Ming (1368-1644) court were intimidated by Chinese development. However, this fear doesn’t seem to have been related to real or potential economic or military competition. Rather, it was more about the fact that China didn’t seem that interested in the West at all. In fact, China on the whole then wasn’t too impressed with Western civilization, religion, art, or science, nor with white skin, blonde hair, or blue eyes. So imagine showing up, quite confident in your racial and cultural superiority, buoyed by your faith in the one true God, only to be met with a polite yawn: an existential crisis indeed!

Today, the U.S. is afraid of China, not because China poses a direct threat to the U.S., but because China’s alternative political and economic systems and development path pose difficult questions for the U.S. and those under its influence. In particular, the U.S. fears that eventually, led substantially by China, the world may abandon the dollar as the supranational currency, leading to the collapse of the U.S. financial system. Furthermore, the US feels vulnerable given political dysfunction in Washington, which has left U.S. society in steep decline. Decades of fiscal and monetary mismanagement and endless foreign misadventures have taken their toll. Americans do have much to fear: guns, polarization, unscrupulous technology and pharmaceutical companies, crumbling infrastructure, poor airline and railway safety, wildfires and extreme weather, to name a few. Meanwhile, a half-century of suppressing green innovation has left the old backbones of the U.S. economy — namely the oil and legacy automotive industries — vulnerable to irrelevance. But this fear isn’t really about China; it’s about blaming China for your own sad state of affairs.

Whatever you think, whatever you argue, consider the following in closing. Let’s say you’re right, that China has indeed risen as a major power, emerging from the ruins visited upon it by foreign aggression, and despite not resorting to such aggression itself, has become more powerful and globally relevant than ever before. You say, “Well, that’s why we must stop this juggernaut before it’s too late.” And yet, dear fool, that already failed when China was at its absolute weakest. What chance do you have now, with China stronger and you weaker? Wouldn’t it be more sensible to take China at its word and work with Beijing to ensure its vision of a community with a shared future is realized?

Whatever your perspective — emotional or rational, historical or logical — when it comes to China, the only thing to worry about might just be your cholesterol. So, pick up a pair of chopsticks and challenge General Tso to a duel. You can’t lose. But if things go south, feel free to switch to a knife and fork.

Josef Gregory Mahoney is a professor of politics and international relations at East China Normal University and senior research fellow with the Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at Southeast University and the Hainan CGE Peace Development Foundation.