Is China a partner, a competitor or a rival? The U.S. and the EU claim that China is all three simultaneously. This creates an impossible dilemma — like a driver facing a traffic light showing red, yellow and green all at once.

The West’s policy on China today contains inherent contradictions, as it attempts to balance cooperation in some areas with competition and rivalry in others, resulting in mixed and often conflicting perspectives on China’s role in the world.

Today, disagreements between the two sides span a wide range of issues, such as trade, human rights, military competition, technology and global governance. But beneath many of these surface-level conflicts is a more fundamental clash of cultural values, historical traditions and socio-political norms. One of the core root causes lies in the West’s persistent attempt to transform China.

The West has tried to reshape China for centuries. Jonathan D. Spence’s “To Change China: Western Advisers in China” (1969) provides a historical analysis of the various Westerners — missionaries, diplomats, engineers and other advisers — who traveled to China between the 17th and 20th centuries, driven by the goal of transforming the country in line with their own beliefs and ideals.

The book critically examines how these individuals, despite their well-meaning intentions, often failed to understand Chinese culture and society, resulting in unintended and sometimes harmful consequences. Spence highlights the recurring issue of cultural arrogance, emphasizing the difficulties inherent in cross-cultural interactions. Ultimately, the book demonstrates that Western efforts to “change” China were largely unsuccessful and counterproductive.

The West’s desire to change China was often driven by a combination of religious zeal, political ambitions, economic objectives and cultural convictions. Motivated by a sense of superiority and the belief that their values were universally relevant, Western nations and individuals sought to transform China in their own image. While Western ideas and technologies did have a significant impact on China’s development, the Chinese state and society exhibited remarkable resilience and adaptability. From the imperial era to the modern period, Chinese leaders and people selectively incorporated Western elements while firmly resisting changes that could threaten their sovereignty or cultural identity.

Today’s China-West relations show some failures, largely because the West refuses to engage with China on its own terms. Western states have either dismissed the internal transformations unfolding within China or attempted to mold the country in line with their own ideals and expectations. For centuries, an imagined or idealized notion of what China ought to be has lingered in the minds of Western leaders and scholars, often at the expense of understanding its true complexity.

With the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, American hopes for China’s imminent transformation into a Western-style democratic, capitalist and Christian nation quickly evaporated. In the aftermath, the question “Who lost China?” sparked intense debate across the United States. During the “Red Menace” of the McCarthy era, a prolonged and relentless search for those deemed responsible for the alleged loss of China targeted any American intellectual who expressed even the slightest sympathy for the Chinese communist revolution. Recent developments in U.S. legislative efforts to revive initiatives aimed at curbing Chinese influence have prompted comparisons to the McCarthy era. Specifically, the Protect America’s Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act aims to revive a program targeting alleged Chinese espionage in universities and research institutions, especially those linked to the Communist Party of China.

China’s economic reform in the late 20th century provided the West an ideal opportunity to influence China’s economic and political development, promoting capitalism and liberalism. After four decades of persistent efforts, the West now faces the uncomfortable reality that China cannot be reshaped according to Western expectations. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement, “Capitalism didn’t change China; China changed capitalism,” captures a growing sentiment among U.S. policymakers that decades of engagement with China under the assumption it would “liberalize” politically and economically has largely failed.

To understand why the West is so determined to transform China, we must examine the deep ideological foundations that drive Western thinking. Several key theories shape how Western nations view political and social development globally:

1. Modernization theory posits that all societies inevitably progress through similar stages of development, ultimately converging toward Western-style industrialization, secularization, power separation and democracy.

2. Middle-class theory suggests that economic growth leads to the expansion of a middle class, which in turn becomes a driving force for democratic reforms and political pluralism.

3. The authoritarianism-versus-democracy paradigm frames global politics as a binary struggle between repressive, non-democratic regimes and liberal democracies, often demonizing the former as incapable of progress while portraying the latter as morally and functionally superior.

4. Finally, the democratic peace thesis believes that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, promoting the idea that global peace is best achieved through the spread of democratic governance.

Collectively, these narratives have evolved into a belief system that has historically shaped Western foreign policy, development aid and international interventions. Winning the Cold War convinced the U.S.-led West that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism were not just better systems but the inevitable future for all nations. However, China’s global rise has challenged this conviction, demonstrating that modernization can follow an indigenous, non-Western path.

By labeling China a “systemic rival,” the West reveals its deep anxiety about an “illiberal China” gaining prominence in the international order. This unease stems from China’s economic success and global rise challenging the West’s long-held political and ideological assumptions. Rather than following the liberal democratic path anticipated by the West, China is increasingly viewed as a “revisionist” power – one not only capable of challenging Western dominance, but also of presenting alternative models of governance and development, shaped by its unique Chinese characteristics.

Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden’s national security adviser, finally admitted last year that “We realize that efforts, implied or explicit, to shape or change the PRC over several decades did not succeed … we have to find ways to live alongside one another.” The Trump administration also appears less concerned with value-based politics and more focused on striking favorable deals.

Make no mistake: China has already changed, is always changing and will continue to change — but strictly on its own terms. The internationally recognized “Chinese development model” evolved through decades of experimentation, learning from both successes and failures and adapting to changing global conditions while continuously refining strategies.

The history of Chinese economic modernization itself is a good story about China’s transformation in its own way. It unfolded through a gradual, experimental approach, often captured by the proverb “crossing the river by touching the stones” — a metaphor for cautious, step-by-step progress guided by pragmatism and flexibility. Rather than pursuing radical overhauls, this process favored incremental adjustments.

Two core strategies define China’s modernization trajectory. The first is selective learning, where China adopted key aspects of neoliberal economics — such as market liberalization, innovation, entrepreneurship and integration into global trade — while deliberately rejecting elements that could threaten state control or social stability. The second is trial adaptation, which involves sequencing reforms to reduce resistance and maintain stability. Reforms were introduced in a carefully considered order: starting with less politically sensitive changes before moving to more complex ones, initiating rural reforms before urban ones, focusing first on coastal development before extending growth inland, and embracing economic marketization while maintaining fundamental political principles.

These experiences enabled China to build institutional and economic capacity incrementally, ensuring that lessons from earlier phases helped shape and support later reforms. The model emphasizes how pragmatic reforms, guided by state stewardship, can facilitate adaptive development while avoiding the risks associated with abrupt transitions.

The West must abandon the illusion that it can remake China in its own image. A more just and equitable world order is likely to be characterized by diverse political models, cooperation among many nations, and power distributed across several world centers rather than dominated by a single country. In the coming years and decades, the West must learn to get along with China by expanding exchanges and cooperation with it on an equal footing, ceasing its condescending approach and restraining its impulse to change the Asian giant.

Li Xing is a Yunshan leading scholar and director of the European Research Center at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies and an adjunct professor of international relations at Aalborg University, Denmark.